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NOTES
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In a child custody case, the mother sought to take the depo-
sition of the father's neuropsychiatrist, but the father objected
that the medical information was privileged. Held, a physician-
patient privilege did not bar the physician from testifying in a
civil action. Moosa v. Abdalla, 248 La. 344, 178 So. 2d 273
(1965).
In light of present constitutional and statutory provisions,
as well as prior jurisprudence, this decision is correct.' How-
ever, it is one more step toward anomaly in the area of physician-
patient privilege in Louisiana law. Louisiana is the only state
with a physician-patient privilege in criminal cases 2 but not in
civil cases. Yet a psychologist-patient privilege exists in both
civil and criminal cases.3 This paper will consider possible solu-
tions to this problem. Such considerations are timely, as the
Louisiana State Law Institute is now preparing a Code of Evi-
dence.
The principle of privileged communications is based on an
exception to the general rule that any witness must testify to
all relevant facts he knows. It is felt, in certain instances, that
the general public benefits more by the exclusion of relevant
1. La. Const. art. 178 (1879) ; La. Const. art. 297 (1898); La. Const. art.
297 (1913); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1921) provides: "The Legislature shall
provide . . . for protecting confidential communications made to practitioners of
medicine and dentistry and druggist by their patients and clients while under
professional treatment and for the purpose of such treatment." State v. Genna,
163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927) (The constitutional provision is not self-opera-
tive in connection with public and private doctors. It calls for legislative imple-
mentation if privilege desired) ; Boulware v. Boulware, 153 So. 2d 182 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963). See generally Comment, 20 LA. L. REv. 418 (1960) ; The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term -- Evidence, 26 LA.
L. REV. 606, 614 (1966).
2. LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950) : "No physician is permitted, whether during or
after the termination of his employment as such, unless with his patient's express
consent, to disclose any communication made to him as such physician by or on
behalf of his patient, or the result of any investigation made into the patient's
physical or mental condition, or any opinion based upon such investigation, or
any information that he may have gotten by reason of his being such physician;
provided that the provisions of this article shall not apply to any physician,
who, under the appointment of the court, and not by a selection of the patient,
has made investigation into the patient's physical or mental condition; provided,
further, that any physician may be cross-examined upon the correctness of any
certificate issued by him."
3. Id. 37:2366: "A certified psychologist shall not be examined without the
consent of his client, as to any communication made by the client to him or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall a certi-
fied psychologist's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined without the
consent of his employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has
acquired in such capacity." The origin of this provision is interesting. See La.
Acts 1964, No. 347, § 16.
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testimony than by its admission. England has never held that
communications between a patient and his doctor merit such
protection. New York was the first common law jurisdiction to
adopt a physician-patient privilege ;4 since then, a majority of
states have adopted such a privilege in some form.5 Its justi-
fication is a desire to encourage the patient to disclose to his
physician all information relevant to his treatment. But since
its inception, writers have offered reasons why this justifica-
tion is outweighed by other factors. The best reason comes from
Professor Wigmore, who tests the propriety of any privileged
communication with four canons: "(1) The communications
must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the par-
ties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that
would inure to the relation by disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation." 6 All must be answered affirmatively for
the privilege to be sustained, but Wigmore feels that for the
physician-patient privilege, only the third can be answered in
the affirmative. 7 Also, there is a lack of evidence that patients
in England and the New England states, where no physician-
patient privilege exists, "stay away from the doctor's office on
that account." Another reason offered is that since few people
are aware of it, and thus do not rely on it, it serves no purpose.
Finally, it is believed that one's ordinary ailments are a favorite
topic of conversation, and that even though such may not be
true for serious ailments, no one would fail to seek medical
attention from fear that others may learn of them.
4. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. part III, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73 (1829), reprinted in
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954): "No person authorizcd to practice physic
or surgery shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may have ac-
quired in attending any patient, in a professional character, and which informa-
tion was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician,
or to do any act for him as a surgeon."
5. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380, n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961) for a listing
of physician-patient privilege statutes as of 1961. See also CALIF. EVIDENCE CODE§§ 990-1007 (1965) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1959).
6. 8 WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. Id. § 2380a.
8. Chafee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on
the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1943). For other discussions see
Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1906) ; Curd, Privileged
Communications Between Doctor and His Patient -An Anomaly of the Law, 44
W. VA. L.Q. 165 (1938) ; Welch, Another Anomaly-The Patient's Privilege,
13 Miss. L.J. 137 (1941).
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Three possible approaches to the privilege are: (1) Adopt a
privilege containing currently recognized exceptions necessary
for preventing abuses. (2) Adopt a "quasi privilege" which
would prohibit disclosures by physicians unless the trial judge,
in his discretion, determines disclosure is necessary to the proper
administration of justice. (3) Repeal the statutory privilege in
criminal cases, thus leaving Louisiana with no physician-patient
privilege.
1. Adopt a Privilege With All Its Exceptions
The New York statute in 1828 simply provided that all dis-
closures to the physician "necessary to enable him to prescribe
for such patient as a physician" were protected. No exceptions
were recognized. However, as the various states adopted privi-
lege statutes, it became obvious even to those in the medical
profession that certain abuses of the privilege were occurring.
Some of these abuses were combatted by making various excep-
tions to the privilege. A few of the more important exceptions
will be discussed.
(a) The privilege should not apply in criminal cases.
A majority of states make no distinction between criminal
and civil cases in applying the privilege. The few that do, allow
the privilege in civil but not in criminal cases. 10 Louisiana is
the only state with a privilege in criminal cases but none in civil
cases.
In certain criminal prosecutions, as homicide, abortion, and
malpractice, the public interest in prosecuting offenders out-
weighs any justification allowing the privilege to prevent a
doctor's relevant testimony. From this position it is but a short
step to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which do not allow the
privilege in any felony case.1 It is submitted that one should
not stop here. The public interest in protection from all crimes,
including misdemeanors, is great enough for the privilege not
to exist in any criminal prosecution.
(b) The privilege should not apply in suits to deter-
mine the competency of a deceased patient when his
9. See note 4 8upra.
10. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-6 (1949) ; HAWAii REV. LAWS § 222-20
(1955) ; MONT. REV. CODE tit. 93, ch. 704, § 4 (replacement vol. 1964) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958) ; S.D. CODE tit. 36, § 36.0101(3) (Supp. 1960).
11. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 27(2).
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competency is relevant to validity of an instrument by
which he disposed of property.
It is important to recognize in discussing this exception and
the next that the privilege is personal to the patient. The phy-
sician is always a competent witness and must testify unless
the privilege is asserted by the patient or, after his death, 12 his
personal representative.
This exception has its greatest value in guaranteeing the
expert medical testimony which is often lacking in cases con-
testing validity of a will. The deceased patient would want the
information disclosed if it allows the court to discover his true
intentions.
(c) The privilege should not be used by a beneficiary
of life insurance to exclude communications between the
insured and his physician.
Again the court must first determine whether the asserter
(the beneficiary in this case) is a proper representative of the
deceased patient. The most frequent application of this excep-
tion is when a life insurance company seeks to prove the in-
sured made misrepresentations of his physical condition. When
the insurance company attempts to use the testimony of the
insured's physician, the beneficiary asserts the physician-patient
privilege. This objection is usually nothing more than a tactical
maneuver to conceal the fraudulent acts of the insured. Thus
the same argument used against the privilege in criminal cases
can be used to prevent its use to foster fraudulent acts. This
exception would go further and prevent use of the privilege to
exclude relevant communications between the insured and his
physician when there are no allegations of misrepresentation.
Even here the instances where the beneficiary asserts the priv-
ilege out of loyalty to the deceased would be too few to justify
the suppression of valuable medical testimony.
(d) The privilege should not apply in commitment
proceedings.
There should be no privilege because the proceedings are
primarily for the benefit of the holder of the privilege and the
12. For a discussion of who should be able to assert the privilege of the de-
ceased patient, see 8 WIGMoaE, EVIDENCE 2391 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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public has a great interest in the prompt and proper care of the
mentally incompetent.
(e) The privilege should not apply when the patient
seeks recovery for personal injuries.
Here, as in the life insurance cases, the privilege may be
used to foster fraudulent acts. An injured plaintiff who is
exaggerating his injuries can assert the privilege to exclude tes-
timony of the physician who treated him - often the only means
of proving the extent of his injuries. It is submitted that the
plaintiff "waives" his physician-patient privilege when he de-
scribes his injuries in his petition and demands damages. Al-
though some old cases require something more from the pa-
tient, 13 such as calling the physician to the stand 14 or testifying
himself to the extent of the injuries, 15 to constitute a waiver,
the recent trend in statutory privilege is to create an exception
in personal injury cases.'( In fact some states have gone even
further by excepting "in all civil suits brought by or against the
patient, ... wherein the patients physical or mental condition
is an issue. "17
Other instances where there should be an exception are when
a patient seeks the services of a physician to enable him to
commit a tort, 8 when the abuse of children is involved,19 and
when a physician is suing a patient for the recovery of profes-
sional fees. Further, in workmen's compensation cases, it is gen-
13. Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Dalo, 252 Fed. 356 (9th Cir. 1918) ;
Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907) ; Kassow v. Robertson,
143 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio App. 1957); American Bankers' Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 67
Okla. 150, 169 Pac. 489 (1917).
14. Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 76 Ohio App. 483, 65 N.E.2d 300, 72
N.E.2d 245 (1947) ; McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wash. 2d 65, 253 P.2d 632, on rehear-
ing, 257 P.2d 636 (1953).
15. Hethier v. Johns, 233 N.Y. 370, 135 N.E. 603 (1922) ; In re Lowenthal,
101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N.E.2d 158 (1956).
16. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1959), exception 5 (the relatively
recent Illinois physician-patient privilege statute contains 7 exceptions); CALIF.
EVIDENCE CODE § 996 (1965) (the California phsyician-patient statute, which is
the most recent one, contains 12 exceptions) ; UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 27(4).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1959).
18. CALIF. EVIDENCE CODE § 997 (1965) ; UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 27(6).
19. See Symposium - The Battered Child Syndroiae, 181 A.M.A.J. 17 (1962)
for an extensive analysis of the problem of child abuse. As a result of the na-
tional interest the problem recently gained, numerous state legislatures reacted by
abolishing the physician-patient privilege in child abuse cases. Louisiana's statute
is typical. See LA. R.S. 14:403 (1954).
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erally recognized that the technical rules of evidence such as
the physician-patient privilege should not be applied. 2°
2. Adopt a "Quasi Privilege"
A second alternative would be to adopt a "quasi privilege."
The one presently in force in North Carolina provides:
"No person, duly authorized to practice physic or sur-
gery, shall be required to disclose any information which
he may have acquired in attending a patient in a profes-
sional character, and which information was necessary
to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician,
or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the
presiding judge of a superior court may compel such dis-
closure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to the
proper administration of justice."'2 1
Professor McCormick says "a clear-eyed and courageous judici-
ary, trial and appellate, with an appreciation of the need for
truth and fear of its suppression, could draw the danger of in-
justice from the privilege, under this provision. '22 However,
the North Carolina statute did not live up to expectations. Indi-
cations are that judges have failed to use their wide margin of
judicial discretion to correct some of the classic abuses of the
privilege. 23 As a result an attorney is too uncertain to fully
advise his client on the availability of the privilege in a par-
ticular situation.
3. Abolish the Privilege
A third alternative is to simply abolish the privilege. In
favor of this approach, the traditional arguments previously
mentioned can be advanced. The following are particularly im-
portant for Louisiana to consider. This state does not have to
look as far as England or New England to find states managing
20. Professor Wigmore lists 27 "privilege states" which repudiate the privilege
in workmen's compensation cases. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2380, n.6 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961). See also Morgan v. American Bitumul Co., 39 So. 2d 139
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953). Virginia has a similar provision. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-289.1 (1950).
22. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 108 (1954).
23. Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326
(1962) (suit by life insurance beneficiary) ; Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C.
754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964) (personal injury suit); Creech v. Sovereign Camp
of the Woodmen of the World, 211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937) (suit by life
insurance beneficiary) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199, 139
S.E. 228 (1927) (suit by life insurance beneficiary).
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successfully without a physician-patient privilege. Closer to it
are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. 24 Today, even the
medical profession seems to recognize that if privilege is to be
established, numerous exceptions must be made. How can an
ordinary layman rely on a privilege with these exceptions and
details when he goes to his physician for treatment? Finally,
even assuming that the ordinary layman was familiar with the
privilege and disclosed all to his physician in reliance upon it,
how could he be sure that subsequent events would not permit
one of the exceptions to apply?
For these reasons, it is submitted that the policy factors in
favor of a physician-patient privilege are outweighed by those
against it. Thus Louisiana should add its name to the list of
''no privilege" states.
James E. Bolin, Jr.
24. Compare MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDECE § 491 (2d ed.
1956), which seems to indicate the author's satisfaction with Texas' no-privilege
status, to Welch, Another Anomaly-The Patient's Privilege, 13 Miss. L.J. 137
(1941), where the author expresses a view that Mississippi's physician-patient
privilege has been unsuccessful and suggests its abolition.
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